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MEMORANDUM CASES

THE COURT.-This is a mandamus proceeding in which
the judgments in consolidated actions reviewed on appeal in
Pickens v. Johnson, ante, p. 399 [267 P.2d 801], are attacked on one of the grounds urged on that appeal. Inasmuch as the appeal disposes of that issue, the petition for the
writ is denied and the alternative writ discharged. (See
California ToU Bridge Authority v. Durkee, 40 Cal.2d 341
[253 P.2d 673] .)
Dooling, J. pro tern. sat in place of the Chief Justice, who
deemed himself disqualified.

[42 C.2d 874; 267 P.2d 1037]

[S. F. No. 18771. In Bank.

Mar. 12, 1954.]

' FRANCIS CARROLL, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR
COURT OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO, Respondent; DONALD E. PRESLEY,
Real Party in Interest.
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from enforcing an order for inspection of photographs. Writ granted.
Landels & Weigel and Stanley A. Weigel for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Dan L. Garrett, Jr., for Real Party in Interest.
SHENK, J.-The petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to
restrain the respondent court from enforcing its order for
the inspection of certain photographs in his possession. An
alternative writ was issued.
The order was made in an action entitled Presley v. Pacific
Greyhound Lines, now pending in the respondent court. The
plaintiff therein seeks to recover damages allegedly suffered
by him from injuries received while riding on the defendant's bus and caused by defendant's alleged negligence in
operating the bus. Before trial in that action the plaintiff
moved under section 1000 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
an order permitting him to inspect and copy photographs
in the possession and control of defendant and its attorney,
Francis Carroll, the present petitioner.
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:Affidavits were filed in .behalf· of the respective parties.
The affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff was made by his
counsel. It avers that the defendant and its attorneys' have
possession of photographs of the scene ofthe accident depicting the "condition of the said Greyhound Bus following
the said accident,.. skid marks, debris, the condition of the
highway £ollowing said aecident and other material and
relevant evidence as to the occurrence of said accident.'' An
affidavit in opposition to the motion was also filed. !t states
that the ·photographs were taken by the agents of defendant
for the purpose of delivering them to its attorneys and
were in fact taken and delivered to. the attorneys to :enable
t4e:n:i: to prepare a defense to the action. It is insisted that
the privilege of attorney and client attaches to the information. c0ntained in the photographic evidence.
The. court .granted the. motion and ordered the inspectiqn.
T:Q.e .defendant and th~ · petitioner have refused to c0n1piy
With the order and are threatened with punishment .for
C:o:q.1;:empt. The petitio}1er seek$ to restr,aih the trial court
from pr()<meding with the enforcement of its order by ·this
appliei!tio11• fol' the writ of. prohibition.
The qnestiong prege~ted.inthis .G"ase are substantially .the
san1e as ,those involved in the co:n:i:panion case of Holm v~
SuiJeri()f' (]Qurt~ ante, P• 500 (267 .P.2d: 1025, 268 P~2d 722L
this. day filed. It was thete held that where the right to .asse:rt
the privilege is clear .the. bill of discovery cannot he,used ~o defeat it ;. thatwhere a communication ishetwreu corporate eTI1.'
J>lo;yees 3.Ild . is embodied .in .photographic •.. evii!<:J.n~e .for redelivery .to a eor:po:rate ll,ttorne;y7 the privilege attaches if
the photQg~~phs were crea:t~d as a. means of co~mull.i:eating
info:rlllation to the attorney, and .that where the d?~inant
purpo~e is the trftnsmission of Jnformation to •an attorn~y
i:n his professional eapa~ity it is immaterial i;}l'llt there are
other incidental purposes J§Ot entitl~d to the privilege.
In the present case there is no conflict with the petitioner's affidavit showing that the photographs were taken
for the express purpose of being transmitted to the defendant's attorneys to .be used in .the threatened litigation. The
petition for the writ of prohibition reasserts such a purpose
and neither the respondent court nor the real parties in
interest· have answered it. The facts before the trial court
required a determination that the transmittal of the photographs to the attorneys was for the purposes of the litigation
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and that this was the dominant if not the sole purpose. To
deny the privilege in such circumstances was an abuse of
discretion.
Let the peremptory writ issue as prayed. The alternative
writ is discharged.
Gibson, 0. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, J.-I concur in the judgment on the ground
that petitioner's allegation that the photographs were taken
for the express purpose of transmitting them to him is not
disputed by either the respondent court or the real parties
in interest.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
I agree that the photographs would be privileged if taken
for the purpose of transmittal to defendant's counsel for
use in litigation, but as I pointed out in my dissent in Holm
v. Sttperior Cmtrt, ante, p. 500 [267 P.2d 1025, 268 P.2d 722],
the burden of proof on that issue rested upon defendant, the
claimant of the privilege. 'l'he trial court was justified in concluding, as it did, that that burden had not been sustained
because it could disbelieve the affidavits supplied by defendant
even though uncontradicted. ''A trial judge is not required to
accept as true the sworn testimony of a witness, even in
the absence of evidence directly contradicting it, and this
rule applies to an affidavit.'' (Lohman v. Lohman, 29 Cal.
2d 144, 149 [173 P.2d 657]; see, also, other cases cited in
Holm v. Superior Court, supra.) The rule is especially applicable in this case since the affidavit is by one of defendant's
attorneys, hardly in a position to be unbiased. The majority
opinion, however, determines the credibility of the affidavit
contrary to the trial court, thus usurping its power.
I would therefore deny the writ.

